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1 Introduction Em-powering economics: Some thoughts on policy and ﬁnancial markets
1 Introduction
Is economics a powerful discipline because it provides clever instruments to make money? Sometimes
it looks so and some people think so. I do not. The historical rise of economics to a leading academic
ﬁeld, that over the last centuries has attracted many of the most talented andmotivated people, is based
on its nature as a science of men. Political Economy or Economics "is on the one side a study of wealth;
and on the other, and more important side, a part of the study of man", as Alfred Marshall says us in
the ﬁrst paragraph of the Principles of Economics. Its power stems from the involvement in the analysis
of the desire of people and how the means to satisfy them can be improved. "Bettering our condition" is
the main goal, Adam Smith tells us in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and he makes clear in theWealth of
Nations that this is no ego trip. "No society can surely be ﬂourishing and happy, of which the far greater
part of the members are poor and miserable." (Smith, 1776, Vol. 1, p. 88).
Many others - often with quite different political values like Karl Marx, JohnMaynard Keynes orMichal
Kalecki - shared the view that economics has a mission in contributing to the bettering of life of the
broad mass of people. To free workers from exploitation, to spare people from macroeconomic crises
and guarantee full employment to them, to establish a fair distribution of income. A most important
ﬁgure among them is of course Kurt W. Rothschild. I could almost summarize my claim by saying: The
power of economics as a discipline lies for me in dealing with the "Rothschild-questions" about how
to contribute to a "better" world. It is based on "the hope that with a better understanding of the eco-
nomic mechanisms a contribution to a more satisfactory economic and social society could be achieved"
(Rothschild, 1999, p.4).
There is another set of "Rothschild-questions" which is crucial for making economics a powerful scien-
tiﬁc discipline. As emphasized by Rothschild from his article on "Price Theory and Oligopoly" (Roth-
schild, 1947) onward, we must bring market imperfections and economic power - "the rare birds of
economic theory" (Rothschild, 2002, p. 433) - back into core economics. They must be acknowledged
as basic features of reality and accounted for in economic analysis to make economics a relevant force
in society. And ﬁnally, there is the "Rothschild conviction" that policy can make a difference, "that
activism and interventionism are possible and useful when conditions are regarded as unjust or unde-
sirable, particularly in regard to basic human needs and extreme inequalities" (Rothschild, 1999, p. 3).
With this paper I wish to contribute to the em-powering of economics by addressing some fundamental
problems of economic power, political power and the ﬁnancial system which many people are worried
about today. In my view, they are related to new forms of power-play and imperfections which require
some daring changes in political and economic thinking and action.
2 Power
"Macht bedeutet die Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenenWillen auch gegenWider-
streben durchzusetzen gleichviel woraus diese Chance beruht." (Weber, 2002, p. 711)
As an economist one might say, power is the possibility to inﬂuence the outcome of a system of
interactions. What is the basis of such possibilities?
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2.1 The basis of power
Under an economic perspective, the outcomes of interactions in the economic and political system are
determined by desires and opportunities.
The opportunities are given by resource endowments, technology and organization, but also by the rules of
the game (the order). In an uncertain world the determinants of opportunities may change. They depend
on which state of the world is realized. In the jargon of modern economics the set of all possible states of
the world, S, and the probability πs with which a speciﬁc state s ∈ S is realized, are often called "nature"
to express that (S, π) are given exogenously and beyond the control of economic agents. However, for
understanding what happens in modern ﬁnancial markets we must not refuse to see that S and π can
be inﬂuenced. I therefore prefer to address (S,π) by the more neutral word uncertainty structure.
Realistically, all determinants of interactions described above are potential sources of power. Thus we
have the following forms: (i) Controlling allocation of substantial amounts of resources. This gives to
an agent market power to inﬂuence the equilibrium allocation of goods (x) and prices (p) and thereby
also the distribution of income, among other things. (ii) Shaping technology and the organization of
work. While traditionally technology was considered as given, the new growth theory has emphasized
endogenous technological change including its implication for the distribution of income and wealth
(see, for instance, the ample literature on skill-biased technical change). In a similar way the organi-
zation of work can impact on people in a powerful way. For instance, it can affect their employability
as I tried to show some times ago (Falkinger, 2002). (iii) Setting the rules of the game. In Rothschild’s
(2002) words: "inﬂuencing the framework which determines the working of market mechanisms" (p.
433). The division of power between policy, which deﬁnes and enforces the rules, and economic agents,
who are playing according to the rules may be formally true but substantial power arises from the fact
that rules are manipulated, inﬂuenced by lobbying activities, ignored or circumvented, in particular in
irregular times. (iv) Inﬂuencing desires and mind-setting. For instance, "by ’immunising’ consumers
more and more against rival invasion through massive advertising" (Rothschild 1947, p. 315). Per-
suasive advertising is one source of power. In view of the ﬂood of information, including informative
advertising, a new form of power becomes crucial: Focusing the perception set of people for instance
by prominent positioning in the media. Moreover, in particular in times of uncertainties, there is room
for what is called expectation or belief management. (v) Finally, as already mentioned, there is the
possibility to affect the uncertainty structure.
Traditionally, the economic debate about economic power, for instance in competition policy or the the-
ory of regulation, focuses on market power in the allocation of resources (type (i)), taking everything
else - technology, economic and political order, preferences and uncertainty structure - as exogenously
given. Partly this is a technical assumption, motivated by modesty or specialization in the division
of labour between disciplines. However, as stressed by Rothschild many times, it often goes beyond
that and turns into an ideological position. An example to which Rothschild (2002, p. 437) refers is
the view prominently expressed by Böhm-Bawerk (1914), that in the long-run the will of economic
agents or states to exert power or to inﬂuence economic outcomes are irrelevant, and only the power
of economic laws prevail.1 Or, take in particular the so-called neoclassical production and distribution
theory, according to which factor shares are determined by the factors’ elasticities of production.2 My
1 In the words of Böhm-Bawerk, "daß ebenso wie die Gesetze des rein natürlichen Geschehens sich unabhängig vonMenschenwillen und
Menschensatzung in unabänderlicher Folge vollziehen, es auch im ökonomischen Leben Gesetze gebe, gegen die der Menschenwille,
und sei es auch der mächtige Staatswille, ohnmächtig bleibt; daß auch durch künstlerische Eingriffe gesellschaftlicher Gewalten der
Strom deswirtschaftlichen Geschehens sich nicht aus gewissen Bahnen herausdrängen lasse, in die ihn dieMacht ökonomischer Gesetze
gebieterisch zwinge" (p. 205). In particular: "auch in den Preis- und Verteilungsfragen wirkt die ’Macht’ offenbar nicht außerhalb oder
gegen, sondern innerhalb und durch Erfüllung der ökonomischen Preisgesetze" (Böhm-Bawerk, 1914, p. 215).
2 See Guger (2011) for a discussion of Rothschild’s contribution to the theory of wages.
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own view is that technology plays indeed an important role in determining the distribution of market
income which cannot be easily overcome by policy intervention. However, technology is not given by
nature but rather results from investment decisions. Thus, though it is technology that determines the
distribution, it is not nature but investment. While the awareness about the endogeneity of the tech-
nology and thereby the distribution of income has been substantially increased, at least in the growth
and development literature, the possibility that rules of the game, desires or uncertainty structure are
products of economic actions is no familiar item on the agenda of economic research.
I think the main problems of current crises have ultimately to do with power of the form described in
(iii) to (v). I will focus in the rest of this section on the "power-play" about the economic and political
order (in section 2.2) and then turn to a more formal analysis of some basic aspects of man-made un-
certainty structures (section 3) and to the power-play between citizens and ﬁnancial gamblers (section
4).3 As outlined, the uncertainty structure has two components: the set S of "states of the world", and
the probabilities, π, of these states. That π can be inﬂuenced and powerfully exploited has recently
pointed out by Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2011). They show that, under complete ﬁnancial markets,
investment decisions which maximize the shareholder value lead to a distortion of π and thus to an
inefﬁcient equilibrium outcome. My attempt in section 3 leaves π untouched and focuses on variations
of S (by purposeful creation of states of the world).
One general remark on economic power is in order before turning to its interaction with political power.
Rules of the game and uncertainty structure belong to the framework of the economic system, and are
not factors within the system. This has two implications: First, theymay be less vulnerable to inﬂuences
from powerful economic agents in regular times, but they certainly are in fundamental crises. Secondly,
agents need "systemic position" to exert pressure on the system. The economic basis of a systemic role
is to be a provider of key factors of production to all industries. Basic industries, energy or the trans-
port sector are relevant examples in history. But in present days, the ﬁnancial sector is clearly the most
salient one.
2.2 Political power and the power of policy
To assess the power of policy, in particular in comparison with the power of economic agents, we must
evaluate the economic basis of this power along the determinants of power outlined in section 2.1.
Many discussions about the primacy of policy or the loss of this primacy seem to have the following
framework in mind. In a kind of natural division of power, "nature" determines resources, technology
and uncertainty structure; policy decides about the economic order; and economic subjects play within
the possibilities given by nature and the rules set by policy. Such views are clearly naive. And any
attempts to contain the current crisis by appealing to the primacy of policy along these lines are doomed
to fail. As discussed previously, "nature" as well as the "economic order" are substantially inﬂuenced
by economic forces.4 This does not mean, however, that compared to powerful economic agents policy
is powerless in principle. Not at all. Before explaining this in more detail I have to deﬁne the words
"policy" and "political power" more clearly. Since any power has an economic basis it doesn’t make
3 Control of perception and expectation management are closely related to the uncertainty structure, since they determine which states
of the world people have in mind and what are their beliefs about the realization of states. But it clearly goes beyond that and would
require a systematic integration of media and mass communication in economic equilibrium analysis. See Falkinger (2007, 2008) for an
attempt to go into this direction.
4 In Rothschild’s (1947) words "ﬁrms become active agents which have the power to change those very market factors" on which conven-
tional notions of price formation in markets reley (p. 304). Therefore, "the separation of the economic from the political must necessarily
result in a very incomplete picture" (p. 317).
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sense to speak of political power as opposed to economic power. What does make sense, however, is
to speak of political agents in contrast to economic agents. Both types of agents can have control over
economic resources and thus can exert economic power in a conventional sense. Moreover, political
as well as economic agents can inﬂuence policy and have thus political power. I therefore restrict in
the further discussion the word "political power" to the capacity to deﬁne the rules of the game, the
economic and political order. In contrast, I use "policy" to refer to a "business" or a "sector" - the public
or political sector, run by political agents like "governments". Thus, the "power of policy" is the power
of states, governments, the public sector, which has to be clearly distinguished from "political power"
in the sense of effective rule and order setting. How powerful is "policy"?
(i) A ﬁrst fact to notice is that policy has big economic power. It controls a large share of economic
resources. The public sector share in industrialized market economies is between roughly 30 percent
and 60 percent. Thus, no private sector has comparable economic power in inﬂuencing the allocation
of economic resources and thus the distribution of market income.5 Thus even without redistributive
taxes and transfer, policy is the most powerful economic agent in a conventional sense.
(ii) Clearly, policy has also political power. In a formal sense, this is trivial because policy has monopoly
rights in establishing legal rules and enforcing them. While it is naive to believe that this de jure
monopoly automatically materializes in de facto power, the fact that formally rule-setting is the busi-
ness of the political sector gives to policy an advantage over the private sector in the power play about
rules and order, at least in ordinary times. However, if economic power is very concentrated or in deep
crises the picture may become blurred. For instance, policy may be tempted to collude with the wealthy
elite or is confronted with oligarchic pressure and more effective threats from system-relevant agents.
(iii) As emphasized at the end of section 2.1, for the de facto power in inﬂuencing the rules of the game
the systemic position of an agent is relevant. Economically, an agent or an industry has a powerful po-
sition in the system if it provides key inputs to all the other agents and industries. The ﬁnancial sector
is the typical example. But despite the overwhelming role of ﬁnancial services for households, ﬁrms
and states, one should not forget that the political sector produces by far the broadest range of crucial
inputs to economic activities, in particular by providing the legal and the monetary system.6 Without
this system, there is no deal, in particular no ﬁnancial intertemporal transaction. Hence, policy has
also a power advantage by its systemic position even though it has no monopoly as a system-relevant
player.
In sum, I do not share the view that the political sector is poor and helpless vis-à-vis some economic
demons out there. Policy has a very strong basis for power, also from the point of view of de facto power.
So why is the primacy of policy an issue? Turning means of power into effective power requires - like
any other production process - effective organization and management of the means. In this respect,
policy has currently clear handicaps compared to strong private players. Some of them are inherent to
policy; others could be overcome in principle.
(i) Modern companies think strategically and pursue their goals by top down leadership. Their goals
are very focused with clear priority to increase the value of the ﬁrm for its owners. Clearly, policy
is a very different business. The goals have many dimensions and instead of support by usually a
few shareholders the support by the citizens is required. Technically speaking, aggregation of political
5 I am not talking about redistribution by taxes and transfers here, but about the fact that the demand for resources by the public sector
affects equilibrium prices, in particular the factor prices.
6 There are of course many other public goods which serve as intermediate inputs for private activities: Infrastructure, basic research but
also public security and social stability.
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preferences is much more complex than aggregating preferences over money. Thus, in this respect
policy has an inherent handicap. This means, to the extent in which private agents enter the ﬁeld of
policy they face the same handicaps. Issues like corporate social responsibility or the discussion about
shareholders vs. stakeholders may serve as an example.7 The lesson to be learned from this is in my
view the following: Whoever wants to exert political power in crises must deﬁne some prime goal and
seek some basic consensus on it. "If you only have one target, you can always meet it." Rothschild (2009,
p. 145) meant this sentence as a critic of admirers of policies which brought down inﬂation - at the cost
of other goals. In my view, however, in a serious situation, policy must focus on one goal and clearly
communicate this goal - to the people, to get their support, and to the market, in order to effectively
obtain control, and to stabilize the economic system such that then other urgent goals can be solved. I
will describe below what the prime goal should be in my opion.
(ii) Modern companies act globally, whereas policy is organized locally. This handicap of policy is not
inherent to policy. The range of political organization units has changed often throughout history. The
organization in the form of national states is not given by "nature", but can be changed. The second
lesson to be learned is this: If we want to guarantee the primacy of policy in setting rules of the game,
one has to bring the range of policy in line with the most powerful private agents. In my view, this does
not mean that we have to wait for a world government. To some extent frictionless global mobility is
more a threat than reality. Also a global player needs reliable suport by powerful national governments
or existing international organizations. Even if only the one or the other of themwithdraw this support,
the global player is substantially hurt.
What does this mean in practice, here and now?
2.3 Disorder in the financial system and regulation
My view on the current situation is as follows: We have a serious crisis which requires extraordinary
measures. The crisis is for me not conﬁned to some speciﬁc events in the ﬁnancial markets in 2011 or
200x, but consists in the fact that over the last twentyﬁve years or so the ﬁnancial system got out of or-
der. This applies also to speciﬁc current cases like the crisis of Greece. Neither would Greece have been
able to build up the huge debt, if the international ﬁnancial industry would not have been reckless, nor
would the restructuring of Greece be detrimental if the European banking sector were sound.
The basic structure of the disorder is this: The mass of consumers and producers need some set of ﬁnan-
cial services and products (everyday payments, insurance, saving for durable goods and for old age,
credits and equity funds for investment etc.).8 Therefore a stable banking and insurance system is vital
for society. In the last decades, supported by economics and politics, a huge wave of so-called ﬁnancial
innovations has inﬂated the set of ﬁnancial products and services provided by the ﬁnancial industry.
In theory, these ﬁnancial innovations help to complete markets and allow ensuring risks which were
uninsured so far. This may be true for some innovations and good for the one or the other agent who
is exposed to speciﬁc risks. But more importantly, the innovations create new risks, in particular also
7 See Franck (2011) for critical reﬂections on these notions in the light of a realistic picture of the governance problem of modern compa-
nies.
8 Technically, the households require ﬁnancial products to bring their stream of income in line with the stream of life-time consumption.
Priority lies on the stream of necessary and convenient goods, and what they fear most is the downward risk, in particular when getting
older. See Binswanger (2004) for a rigorous model of loss-aversion in an OLG-equilibrium model of saving. (See also Binswanger, 2007,
for an application to pension systems.)
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for those who do not need these products in the ﬁrst place. This has generated kind of a progressive
inﬂation of ﬁnancial products and transactions. Technically, this means that the uncertainty structure
of the economy changes fundamentally, namely by an inﬂation of the set of states of the world. It is the
purpose of section 3 to show this more rigorously in a general equilibrium model with asset markets.
In section 4, I consider the relationship between ﬁnancial innovations and the return-risk structure of
the ﬁnancial system from a more aggregate perspective. The bottom line is that the means employed to
generate high returns created negative externalities in the form of social risks.
The prime goal of policy therefore must be to bring the ﬁnancial system in order. A minimum action
required is to separate investment banking from the banking sector for ordinary people and business,
and that states and public funds, in particular pension funds do only engage with ordinary ﬁnancial
business. Ultimately, however, I doubt that putting the investment banking sector in quarantine is suf-
ﬁcient. Given the experience of the last twenty-ﬁve years, ordinary people and ﬁrms, states and public
communities, pension funds and ordinary banks will be tempted to try the gamble again if they see that
some have become very rich in quarantine. "No man of spirit will consent to remain poor if he believes
his betters to have gained their goods by lucky gamblings." (Keynes 1923, p. 24). Therefore, a stricter
form of regulation may be needed for a credible and sustainable solution. In other industries we accept
that potentially dangerous products have to be tested and go through some admission process before
being supplied to the market. In a similar way, ﬁnancial products which potentially affect the ﬁnancial
system should not be admitted to the market before the general equilibrium or macroeconomic effects
are understood.9 Since ﬁnancial innovations have the purpose to complete markets the proof has to be
conducted in an incomplete market model. Moreover, because potentially dangerous products for the
system affect in particular also producers and ordinary people, the model must include a production
sector and ex ante heterogeneity of wealth of consumers. Return regulation could be an alternative
measure. As argued in section 4, putting a cap or a progressive tax on the average return of ﬁnancial
agents (banks, funds and their managers etc.) would have a similar effect, since the extra-ordinary high
returns are related to the boom of ﬁnancial innovations which at the same time has produced extraor-
dinary risks for the system.10
One may argue that such policies would be quasi equivalent to closing down the investment banking
and hedge funds industry, since a big fraction of derivatives and other products with high leverage do
not pass the test. Well, all the worse if this is true. It proves that the system has got out of order and
regulation is required. In a certain sense, the outlined proposal is nothingmore than taking seriously re-
cent initiatives of corporate social responsibility in business and ﬁnance. Some leading business schools
and ﬁnance institutions even refer to the Hypocratic Oath in this context. Now, "nihil nocere" is an ideal
which if interpreted strictly requires too much in an uncertain world in which nobody is perfect. But
establishing procedures and regulations, which require careful examination of potential damages and
side effects, and rule out products and treatments which potentially lead to epidemic damage or whose
social beneﬁts are small compared to the system risks, is surely sound and good practice.
The ﬁnancial sector is a global business. Is it realistic, that the outlined goal to bring the ﬁnancial system
in order by strong regulations can actually be achieved? I don’t know the future, but one should keep in
mind that global leadership, and action on a clearly and narrowly deﬁned goal does not require a global
government. In my view, it is not unthinkable that the US, Europe or China - and possibly the one or
the other big economy - alone or in combination - take a bold step of regulation that changes the global
9 The need for approval of ﬁnancial products by a Financial Products Safety Commission was also stressed in the Commission of Experts
of the President of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System (Stiglitz, 2009). See also
Crotty and Epstein (2009 a,b).
10Keynes (1923) pointed out a more general socio-economic point. "The economic doctrine of normal proﬁts, vaguely apprehended by
everyone, is a necessary condition for the justiﬁcation of capitalism." (p. 24)
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game. The wide-spread opinion among ordinary people but also business leaders, that something goes
fundamentally wrong with the ﬁnancial system, provides a strong political basis for such a step. If the
established governments won’t do it other political forces will emerge. So at least the hope or rather the
warning of Keynes in his Tract on Monetary Reform in the aftermath of the First World War: "Experience
shows with great certainty that the active part of the community will not submit in the long-run to pay
too much to vested interests, and, if the necessary adjustment is not made in one way, it will be made
in another ..." (Keynes, 1923, p. 58).
3 Risk creation and inflation of financial innovations
In this section I try to formulate the role of an inﬂated uncertainty structure in an equilibrium model
with asset markets. I do this in the standard framework of general equilibrium theory. In a ﬁrst step the
benchmark model of a perfect economy with asset markets is presented. Then I consider the following
deviation from this benchmark: Some agents shift into an environment in which the set of states of the
world is inﬂated by blowing states up in a multiple of uncertain states. Pari passu with this multiplica-
tion of states the asset markets are inﬂated by ﬁnancial innovations which provide "insurance" for the
new risks. In this otherwise ideal world, the inﬂation of the uncertainty structure generates two things:
Business opportunities for the ﬁnancial sector and transaction costs for consumers and ﬁrms.
Before turning to the detailled analysis I want to make a few general remarks. The ﬁrst remark re-
gards the role of ﬁnancial innovations. In theory, ﬁnancial innovations emerge because markets are
incomplete. The missing of markets for states of the world of which we know that they may happen
with a certain probability in the future creates a demand for ﬁnancial products to "insure" these states.
Therefore, ﬁnancial innovations are rightly considered to be a good thing. In practice, however, apart
from such true ﬁnancial innovations there are other ﬁnancial products for which it is hard to see which
missing market they actually insure. If a new product just replicates the insurance function of already
existing products, we have a useless product with a price that conveys no new information. This brings
me to my second remark. Inﬂation in the conventional sense of a change of the general price level of
goods and services is considered to be costly because people have difﬁculties to disentangle changes in
the price level from changes in relative prices. Thus, inﬂation distorts the quality of relative prices as
signals conveying information about the scarcity relationships in the economy. I think that the inﬂation
of ﬁnancial innovations and the ﬂood of prices for new ﬁnancial products generates much more confu-
sion about relative prices and thus the true economic scarcity relations than a change in the price level.
In an ideal world with perfect and complete markets this could not be, but the reality is that a price of
a ﬁnancial product is noise if we do not know which missing market is completed by the product and
how it affects the equilibrium of the system.
My ﬁnal remark is a comment on method. I do not think that the standard general equilibrium
framework mirrors reality. For instance, there is always an unknown future - true uncertainty as it
was called by Keynes and others, which does not boil down to a risky state of nature and a certain
probability of realisation. But I also do not see a constructive alternative to the standard model, in
which I could express my argument in a rigorous way. Given this state of our discipline, my approach
in this section is the following. There is an uncertain world of economic fundamentals. Some of the
uncertain economic fundamentals can be modelled as risky states with probabilities assigned. This is
set S. The risky states in S can be "insured" by ﬁnancial products as explained by general equilibrium
theory. Moreover, not all uncertainties of the world are exogenous economic fundamentals. On the one
hand, there are random processes in nature, which do not interfer with any eocnomomic action. On
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the other hand, there are random proecesses which are created by economic agents. This gives room
for risk exposition and ﬁnancial innovations even if markets with respect to set S are complete. By
choosing this methodological approach I want to make sure that the far-reaching policy conclusions
which follow are based on a ﬁrmly established theoretical ground. There are also true uncertainties of
which I know nothing. The only way in which I can account for this unknowables is to keep in mind
that my model is incomplete.
3.1 General equilibrium with asset markets: Baseline model
As benchmark I consider a simple perfect market economy with complete markets and rational agents
(as outlined, for instance in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, Chapter 19).
3.1.1 Fundamentals
The economy is characterized by a set S = {1, ...., S} of states of the world each of which occurs with
probability πs,∑
s
πs = 1. There is one good (income) and a set I of agents who are endowed with wsi
units of the good, i ∈ I, s = 1, ....., S. The goal of the agents is to maximize expected utility
EUi = ∑
s
πsui(xsi), (1)
where ui is a concave utility function and xsi denotes the quantity of the good consumed by i in state s.
3.1.2 Markets
There are S Arrow-securities rs = (0, ..., 1...., 0) paying one unit of the good if state s is realized. The
spot price of the good is set to one in all states. Denote by qs the price of security rs and let zi = (zsi)s∈S
be the portfolio of assets traded by agent i.
3.1.3 Optimal portfolio choice
After revelation of state s an agent’s budget is wsi + zsi. Thus,
xsi = wsi + zsi (2)
under the optimal plan. Anticipating this whenmaximizing expected utility the agent chooses portfolio
zi by solving
max
zsi
∑
s
πsui(wsi + zsi)
s.t.∑
s
qszsi ≤ 0. (3)
For logarithmic utility functions, ui(.) = ln(.), the ﬁrst-order conditions give us for each s:
11
xis =
πs
αiqs
(4)
where αi > 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the restriction ∑
s
qszsi ≤ 0. Moreover, restriction (3) is
binding under the optimal plan. This gives us, using zsi = xsi − wsi, the condition
11Amore general analysis, including the case of risk-neutral agents, can be found in a preliminary version of this paper (Falkinger, 2011).
Page 9 University of Zurich, Department of Economics, November 27, 2011
3 Risk creation and inﬂation of ﬁnancial innovations Em-powering economics: Some thoughts on policy and ﬁnancial markets
∑
s
πs
αi
= ∑
s
qswsi which reduces to
1
αi
= ∑
s
qswsi (5)
because of ∑
s
πs = 1.
3.1.4 Equilibrium
Market clearing in the asset market requires
∑
i
zsi = 0 for all s. (6)
Note that (2) and (6) imply that also the spot market is cleared, that is, ∑
i
xsi = ∑
i
wsi for all s. Using (2)
and (4), we obtain for (6)
∑
i
πs
αiqs
= Ωs, s = 1, ....., S (7)
where Ωs ≡ ∑
i
wsi is aggregate endowment in state s.
Normalizing prices such that ∑
i
1
αi
= 1, we have:
qs =
πs
Ωs
. (8)
(Alternatively, we could choose q1 = 1 or any other numeraire and adjust αi accordingly.)
Using (5) and (8) in (4), we obtain
xis = Ωs ∑
σ
πσ
wσi
Ωσ
. (9)
Agents can fully insure their endowment risk up to the aggregate risk component Ωs. In each state
of the world, agent i consumes the same share of the aggregate endowment. If there is no aggregate
risk i.e. Ωs = Ω for all s, each agent consumes her or his expected endowment. However, if there
is aggregate risk, or if any non-zero mass of agents generates a systemic risk by inducing aggregate
endowment shocks, all agents share the burden of this risk.
3.1.5 Transaction costs
Realistically, trading in asset markets has transaction costs Ki for a consumer. Ki may depend on the
complexity of the world, in particular the number of uncertain states S, but they may also vary with the
agent’s ability to handle her or his wealth management. For instance, a ﬁnancial agent can do it easily
whereas a consumer may need to delegate this management to a banker. Finally, the cost may also
depend on the effectiveness of the ﬁnancial system. Professional ﬁnancial intervention by a ﬁnancial
sector may lower the cost; market power and other imperfections in the ﬁnancial sector will raise them.
The issue of transaction costs will play a more important role if I come to deviations from the baseline
model. The important thing here is that the above analysis remains valid as long as such costs are
charged lump-sum on the agent. The only thing that changes is the agent’s endowment, namely from
wsi to
w˜si = wsi − Ki (10)
which of course affects then the agent’s consumption possibilities and its utility.
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3.2 An equilibrium model with risk-creation
Suppose now that a subgroup I1 ⊂ I of agents moves (or is moved) to an environment, in which, in each
state s of the world, T − 1 new uncertain alternatives emerge. For instance, they start careless projects
which give them high returns if they are lucky and end in desaster otherwise. Or they save costs by
abandonning quality controls or puffers for bad times. Another example are bets on real or systhetic
random processes whose nature and relationship to the fundamental economic states of the world are
not known or not understood.12 I call I1 "risky agents". The other group of agents, I2 ≡ I − I1, are
called "ordinary agents". As a consequence of the exposition of I1 to additional risk, the world consists
now of S ∗ T states, denoted by st instead of s. If t = 1, we are in the baseline world with ws1i = wsi.
I therefore call s1 "fundamental state". If t > 0, the risky agents face an endowment shock ǫ
i
st . More
precisely, we have
wsti =
{
wsi + ǫ
i
st if i ∈ I1
wsi if i ∈ I2
(11)
where ǫis1 = 0 and, for t = 1, ǫ
i
st is a positive or negative number. For simplicity, I assume that each
sub-state t occurs with probability 1/T so that
πst = πs/T for all s and t. (12)
The new risk exposure clearly opens up a business opportunity for ﬁnancial innovations. Suppose
that markets are completed by new Arrow-securities rst , t > 1, in addition to the securities for s1
considered so far. Note ﬁrst that also ordinary agents i ∈ I2 have to trade in the securities for t > 1.
Otherwise, since security rs1 pays only if s1 = 1 is realised, i would be uninsured in all other states. In
an analogous way to the derivation of equation (9), we obtain
xsti = Ωst ∑
σ
∑
t
πσ
T
wσti
Ωσt
, (13)
where
Ωst = Ωs + Est , Est ≡ ∑
i∈I1
ǫ
i
st . (14)
This shows that in general also ordinary agents, which do not move to the risky environment and are
not exposed to additional individual risks (wsti ≡ wsi for i ∈ I2), are affected by the risk exposition of
risky agent. Only if ǫst = 0 for all t, consumption as given by (13) coincides with (9). Otherwise, there
is a systemic risk component, Est , created by the move of I1 to the risky environment.
Is there a possibility for I2 to escape this systemic infection? In particular, suppose that asset markets
are separated in the following way. For i ∈ I2, the original Arrow-securities rs are available, paying in
each fundamental state s one unit of the good, regardless of which state t is realized. In contrast, i ∈ I1
has only access to the Arrow-securities rst , paying one unit if and only if state st is realized.
Then, we obtain in an analogous way (9), for ordinary agents, i ∈ I2,
xsi = Ω
2
s ∑
σ
πσ
wσi
Ω2σ
, (15)
and for risky agents, i ∈ I1
12One may ask why a risk-averse agent should move to a risky environment. It is however a behavioral fact that some people (although
risk-averse) participate in ﬁnancial gambles, without being forced by insurance motives in the fundamental states of the world. For
instance, buying complex derivatives can generate new risk exposure. Maybe there is indeed a gambling motive involved, maybe it is
confusion or ignorance. Or seduction, imitation, overconﬁdence?
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xsti = (Ω
1
s + Est) ∑
σ
∑
t
πσ
T
wσi + ǫ
i
σt
Ω1σ + Eσt
, (16)
where Ω
j
s ≡ ∑
i∈Ij
wsi, j = 1, 2.
Comparison of (15) with (9) shows that I2 may still be affected by the risk exposition of I1 indirectly.
Market segmentation may change the systemic risk component Ω2s compared to Ωs, as the relevant set
of agents is reduced. Furthermore, whether or not the segmentation of markets is in the end to the
beneﬁt of I2, depends on Ω
2
s as compared to Ωs + Est . For a deﬁnite result suppose, for instance, that
there is no systemic risk in the baseline, that is Ω1s = Ω
2
s ≡ Ω. In this case, for i ∈ I2, equation (15) and
(9) coincide and give
xsi = ∑
σ
πσwσi. (17)
Moreover, i ∈ I1 is indifferent between separated and pooled markets, since (16) coincides with (9) in
this case.
Thus, if there is no aggregate risk in the fundamental economy, if ﬁnancial markets are perfect and if
the completion of markets by new ﬁnancial assets is costless, then there is no effect of risk creation on
the ordinary agents under a separated banking system. This leads us to the central policy questions.
Why do we see risk creation and inﬂation of ﬁnancial innovations? And why is there resistance against
the separation of investment banking from ordinary banking? The answer is to be found in the fact that
things clearly are different in a more realistic world with transaction costs or other imperfections.
3.3 Risk creation and investment banking
I use the label "investment bank" for a risk-neutral agent f with unlimited short selling capacity who
designs and trades ﬁnancial products and helps the other agents i ∈ I in their portfolio management.
They cover their cost by charging on i a fee. It is assumed that the size of the fee rises with the number
of ﬁnancial products in the market or the number of states of the world. Moreover, it may vary with an
agent’s average endowment to be managed. Finally if the investment bank has market power, the fee
also covers rents of the bank. Agent i may have other costs in addition. For instance, own transaction
costs including time and worries involved in optimizing the portfolio. I assume that in sum the costs
can be represented by an increasing function of the number of traded securities
Ki(S) with K
′
i(S) > 0, (18)
and that the investment bank earns a share µ of this cost. The other possible cost factors which were
discussed are considered as shifts of Ki(S). We combine now these transaction costs with the analysis
of risk creation considered in the previous section.
There is only one important change: Endowment wsi is now reduced to
w˜si = wsi − Ki(S ∗ T). (19)
This has a clear consequence for the welfare assessment of separated ﬁnancial markets for I2 to which
I1 has no access. Under such separation, the relevant endowment levels would be
w˜si =
{
wsi − Ki(S ∗ T) for i ∈ I1,
wsi − Ki(S) for i ∈ I2
(20)
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Hence, a separate ﬁnancial market for ordinary people, providing securities only for fundamental
states, would be beneﬁcial, since endowments are not burdened by transaction costs stemming from
ﬁnancial innovations for risky agents. Agent f , the investment bank, clearly has an interest in non-
segmented markets since then its earnings are µKi(S ∗ T) > µKi(S) from all individuals, whereas under
separated markets µiKi(S ∗ T) can be earned only from group I1 while group I2 generates µKi(S).
Morevoer, the investment bank has an interest in risk-creation since this increases the opportunities to
earn money from providing ﬁnancial innovations. If the risk generated by risky agents creates need for
the new ﬁnancial products also among ordinary agents - all the better. For this reason, an investment
bank may even incur costs for creating risk. Assume for the sake of illustration that Ki(.) is uniform
across agents and let n1 be the size of group I1 (without counting f ) and n2 be the size of group I2,
respectively. Then, the bank’s expected income, EΠ = µ∑
i
Ki(S ∗ T) is
EΠI = µ(n1 + n2)K(S ∗ T) (21)
under non-segmented markets, and
EΠS = µn1K(S ∗ T) + n2K(S) < EΠ
I (22)
under segmentation.
This is clearly an extreme example which may be elaborated in many ways. In my opinion it conveys
nonetheless a very important feature of our reality. Risk exposition of a subgroup of the population
has systemic effects on everybody. In particular, it generates in interaction with unregulated ﬁnancial
innovations external effects on ordinary people who do not participate in risky actions. Furthermore,
the creation and detection of risks opens up business opportunities for new ﬁnancial products.
4 On the power-play between citizens and financial gamblers
I have argued that an inﬂation of ﬁnancial innovations has generated a basic disorder of the ﬁnancial
system which carries over to the economy as a whole and ﬁnally puts the stability of the social order at
risk.
In the previous section I outlined how such an inﬂation can emerge in an ideal ﬁnancial market frame-
work and who may potentially beneﬁt from this inﬂation. It was shown that there is a conﬂict of
interests between ordinary agents on the one side (I2 in the notion of the previous section), and banks
- together with agents who expose themselves to a risky environment, on the other side. Reality is
obviously much more imperfect and complex. However, the conﬂict between ordinary people and
what - for lack of a better word - may be called "ﬁnancial gamblers" (a coalition of bankers and ﬁnancial
investors with careless or seduced households, ﬁrms, communities and governments) has become a
crucial topic on the politic-economic agenda. In this section, I want to present what in my view are the
fundamental elements of the game played by the ﬁnancial gamblers, as seen from a macroeconomic
point of view and without any reference to particular micromechanisms.
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4.1 Financial innovations and the return-risk structure: An aggregate framework
Let F be the set of feasible ﬁnancial products and F = {Fj ⊂ F |j ∈ [0,N]} be the family of feasible
combinations of ﬁnancial products.13 Now, one of the most basic insights of ﬁnance is that different
ﬁnancial products generate different returns, where the level of return is positively correlated with risk.
Let return and risk be denoted by ρ and σ, respectively. In addition to the risk considered by the indi-
vidual investor, there is also a social (or macroeconomic, or systemic) risk. Let the social risk be denoted
by Σ. In sum, we have the following mapping
(ρ, σ,∑) : F −→ R3+
Let, for any constant ρ > 0, Fρ := {Fj ⊂ F
∣∣ρ(Fj) ≥ ρ} .14 Furthermore, let σ(ρ) be deﬁned as
the minimal risk consistent with ρ, i.e., σ(ρ) := min{σ(Fj)
∣∣Fj ∈ Fρ} . In an analogous way, deﬁne
∑(ρ) := min{(Fj)
∣∣Fj ∈ Fρ} . With this notation we can collapse the complex and many-dimensional
relationship between (combinations of) ﬁnancial products and their risk-return structure in a two-
dimensional picture as shown in ﬁgure 1.
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In this ﬁgure, r0 represents the minimal-risk interest generated by basic ﬁnancial products like trea-
sury bonds. By using a richer family F1 of ﬁnancial products, for instance shares, one can achieve
returns between r0 and r1 which are associated with higher individual risk and no social risk on top
13The singleton {f} represents product f .
14To save notation I use ρ (and later also σ, ∑) as a constant as well as function symbol. The role of the symbol will be clear from the
context.
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of the individual risk. This is the standard view of portfolio analysis. However, the ﬁnancial devel-
opments in the last decades have led us beyond the region [r0, r1]. A ﬂood of ﬁnancial innovations
has blown up F and family F of combinations of products from F. With a richer family of ﬁnancial
instruments returns beyond r1 have become possible - at the cost of higher individual risks (in line with
the conventional picture). But now also external costs begin to emerge. These costs may come directly
from the high individual risk-exposure σ. For instance, if the high ρ is generated by high leverages,
the capital basis may be too small to effectively bear the high σ on a bad day. This may lead to the
destabilisation of the whole ﬁnancial system familiar from the "too big to fail" discussion. However,
there may be other external costs as well. For instance, as shown in section 3, ﬁnancial products which
are beneﬁcial fo "ﬁnancial gamblers" indirectly expose also the non-gamblers to uncertainty or forces
them to participate in the new ﬁnancial markets even if this implies transaction costs. The most se-
vere external cost comes from confusion.15 To emphasize this point, I propose to distinguish in the
high-return world (ρ ≥ r1) two cases. Let F2 be the family of (combinations of) ﬁnancial products gen-
erating returns in the bracket [r1, r2] with corresponding individual and social risk patterns σ(ρ),∑(ρ).
For example, take highly leveraged investments and derivatives. Furthermore, assume that there is
an even richer familiy F3 of ﬁnancial possibilities which generates returns above r2. Now, a speciﬁc
feature of sophisticated ﬁnancial innovations in the securitization and hedging business has been the
claim that they can insure risks, which have been uninsured so far; thereby providing to the investor a
higher return without incurring higher risks.16 In ﬁgure 1, this type of innovatons is represented by the
downward rotation of σ(ρ) to σ˜(ρ). If F3 were truely efﬁciency-improving innovations, ∑(ρ) should be
rotated downward as well. However, it has been repeatedly revealed by the ﬁnancial crises that much
confusion is out there and the "insurance quality" of sophisticated ﬁnancial products is often illusionary
rather than real. Symbolically, σ˜(ρ) is actually a "broken" line.
The rich family of ﬁnancial innovations, F3, promises to investors extraordinary high returns at low
risk. The question then is: Who pays the cost of the actual individual and social risk implied by the
extraordinary return?
The social risk (BC in ﬁgure 1) is payed by the citizens anyway (as households or ﬁrms, who do not
play in the high-return gamble, or as taxpayers). In addition, many arguments put forward in the re-
cent policy debate by representatives of the ﬁnancial sector require from the citizen to cover also the
illusionary individual risk reduction AB. The argument is blunt as this: Markets do require return r˜m.
Therefore, the public has to make sure that r˜m can be delivered. One may see here a version of what
according to Rothschild (1947) is a basic feature of oligopoly power: "the desire for secure proﬁts" (p.
308). And the opposition of big banks to be split up could be explained by his conclusion that "size"
is one of the means to secure proﬁts, among others. More generally, the inﬂation of the uncertainty
structure has the same harmful consequences which Keynes attributed to deﬂation. It effects "a change
in the existing standard of value, and redistributes wealth in a manner injourious at the same time, to
business and social stability ... In particular, it involves a transference from the active to the inactive"
(Keynes, 1923, p. 118).
15As discussed at the beginning of section 3, the central argument against conventional inﬂation (i.e. a rising price level) is, that people
get confused with respect to the correct assessment of relative prices. The inﬂation of ﬁnancial products however generates an ever
rising ﬂood of new price signals which confuses people and often distorts relative prices directly.
16See Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishy (2011) for a model of ﬁnancial innovations with securities that are perceived to be safe but in fact are
exposed to neglected risk. As a result there is excessive issuance of such securities. They conclude that proposals like levarage control
do not go far enough and regulatory attention should be paid to the scale of ﬁnancial innovation.
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4.2 Policy action required
Crises provoke several types of reﬂexes among economists - reaching from neglect to fatalism. One
reaction resembles to the phrase "Crisis? What Crisis?". Another one is: Let the market fever do its job
and heal our sins, or rather those of the others. Also, some people want that the system totally crashes
hoping that they then can take over. And ﬁnally, there is the story "Schocks happen, also big ones. It’s
a random process". Such views either are naive and reckless, or they hide interests. I therefore think
that besides political leadership also more academic responsibility is required. "In the long-run we are
all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, to useless a task if in temptestuous seasons they can only
tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is ﬂat again." (Keynes, 1923, p. 65).17
Much of the current discussion has focussed on increased capital-requirements and restructuring pro-
cedures for big ﬁnancial institutions. I think that both measures are very appropriate and may be also
sufﬁcient to the extent that the ﬁnancial system operates in the medium social-cost region [r1, r2]. How-
ever, I do think that a more basic message has to be conveyed to the market. In particular, since the
current disorder is more of the type illustrated in the region to the right of r2 in ﬁgure 1. The most
important message to the market is: We take actions so as to make sure that this region of the picture is
closed down so that no more games can be played in this ﬁeld.18 To calm fears that this is too radical
an attack on capitalism, it should be remembered that also Smith supported ﬁnancial regulation in the
interest of the community and of a stable banking system by arguing that "the obligation of building
party walls, in order to prevent the communication of ﬁre, is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of
the same kind [as] the regulations of the banking trade" (cited from the entry on Smith in The New
Palgrave (1987, Vol. 4, p. 371), written by Andrew S. Shinner).
The question is of course, what are measures to make this message credible? If we believe in the rela-
tionships presented in section 4.1, there are only two possibilities: Either forbidding the tools leading
the ﬁnancial system into the high-risk-return region, that is, forbidding ﬁnancial operations F3. This
measure corresponds to the recommendation following from the spreciﬁc micro-economic considera-
tions in section 3. As an alternative, the analysis in the more aggregate framework of section 4.1 sug-
gests an indirect measure for achieving the same goal: Regulations of returns - either by a cap on the
average rate of return or by a sufﬁciently progressive tax on returns. (I do not, in this rough analysis,
distinguish between returns to owners and earnings to managers. They are lumped together under the
ρ.)
Partly capital requirements have the same effect as a cap on returns, since high returns often are re-
lated to high leverage. The advantage of a direct rate of return regulation is that it eliminates also the
attractiveness of other forms of careless investments. And there is the communicative advantage that
the high-risk-high-return connection is addressed directly. One may argue that such a regulation de-
stroys the incentives to innovate. Partly, this is exactly the purpose of the measure, namely to the extent
that the inﬂation of damaging ﬁnancial innovations is stopped.19 One should notice, however, that the
incentives to provide a feasible ρ efﬁciently are not affected by the proposed regulation. Another objec-
tion may be that typically the return of a single operation is by its nature uncertain and only revealed ex
17The often cited dictum of Keynes that "in the long-run we are all dead" has been taken by his opponents as proof of cynism or short-
sighted opportunism. It is in fact the contrary, namely, a call to economists to take their responsibility in difﬁcult times, as the full quote
reveals.
18This comes close to what Rothschild said in a newspaper interview brought to my attention by Gugler (2011, p. 49). "Im Kern geht
es um eine ganz harte politische Frage: Darum, den enormen ﬁnanz-wirtschaftlichen Komplex unter Kontrolle zu bringen, der in den
vergangenen dreissig Jahren entstanden ist und mit dessen neuen Möglichkeiten enorme Gewinne zu machen sind."
19One may also ask whether it wouldn’t be desirable from a macroeconomic point of view, to direct innovative energy more to productiv-
ity progress in the real economy rather than to ﬁnancial innovations, which often are instruments to acquire a larger share of the cake
rather than of producing a larger cake.
Page 16 University of Zurich, Department of Economics, November 27, 2011
5 Conclusion Em-powering economics: Some thoughts on policy and ﬁnancial markets
post so that return regulation is a random punishment. This is a misunderstanding. Any single return
component may be random but the average rate of return of a ﬁnancial player - a bank, a funds and
its managers etc. - can only be extraordinary high if extraordinary risky tools are used. Therefore, the
regulation of these returns hits its target - the risky instruments and actions.
Finally, there is the question of whether the described policies are credible enough to be effective. Let
me start to answer this question with a quite general remark. If there is some truth in the described
positive relationship between high risks and high returns, and if there is some economic logic in the
ﬁnancial market left (otherwise the question of credibility has no meaning in the ﬁrst place), then the
message: We take action so as to bring down the high rates of return - directly or indirectly - is the
only one message which is credible to the ﬁnancial market and to the citizens. To illustrate the point,
consider for instance the argument that banks will not be able to raise the capital they need, if they
cannot deliver the high returns which the market has become acquainted to. Now, if a clear regulation
credibly sends the message that there will be no such high returns any more in no bank, then the capital
which is there in the market will go to where the return is highest within the given limits. If the capital
in the market is too little, to supply to banks a stable capital basis, then the taxpayer pays anyway, in
one form or the other. The most transparent and market-conforming way would be that in this case the
state re-capitalizes the banks and takes shares in return.
Finally, there is the argument of international competition that capital will shy away from locations
with ﬁnancial regulations. As argued in my general remark, this is only to be feared if the regulation is
half-hearted and thus no credible sign that the ﬁnancial system is brought in order. The business model,
to bet on salvation by the taxpayer of a country, is only attractive for the short-sighted investor. Sooner
or later also the taxpayer will go bankrupt. In other words, a location operating in the high-return-
high-risk region in ﬁgure 1 will become a bad investment opportunity sooner or later. The competitive
advantage is with the location in which credible regulation guarantees ﬁnancial order. My guess is that
bankers and investors know this - citizens anyway. They just wait that it happens.
5 Conclusion
Philosophy derives its appeal from questions like what is reality, what is truth or what can we know.
Medicine has the promise to save lives or prolongue them, and physics supports our dream to reach
the stars. The powerful appeal of modern economics as an academic discipline, since when it began to
blossom in the age of enlightment, is grounded on the hope of bettering our condition - not of a few of
us but of the many. A regulated market economy, in which the productive forces unfold competitively
and powers that exploit others or threaten the system are kept under control, has turned out as the
appropriate economic order to achieve this goal.
Recent ﬁnancial crises are no single events but a consequence of the fact that the ﬁnancial system has
got out of order over the last two or three decades. The nature of this disorder is an inﬂation of ﬁnancial
innovations which are meant to complete markets. But even if they do so for some of us, they generate
additional risk for all of us. Technically, this means that the uncertainty structure of the economy is
changed by blowing up the set of uncertain states of the world. This exposes everybody to new risks
and increases the systemic power of ﬁnancial agents who provide ﬁnancial products and services to
"insure" these risks or to deliver higher returns at the cost of increasing externalized risk. If the inﬂated
uncertainty structure leads to a ﬁnancial crisis, the powerful systemic role of the ﬁnancial sector is ex-
ploited by requiring policy measures to save the system. The measures, if not paid immediately by the
taxpayer to avoid recession, increase public debt which in turn is a threat on the system.
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The damming of powerful economic forces like this requires a strong political power, in the sense of a
power which effectively is able to set and enforce rules of the game. De jure, the state is the rule setter,
de facto, however also political power has an economic basis and powerful private agents have political
power too. This has led to proclamations about the primacy of policy to be regained.
I have argued in this paper that the primacy of policy is not in danger because of a lack of economic
means of the public sector. States are very resourceful economic agents. An increase in the public sector
share would therefore not contribute to regaining primacy of policy.20 Themain handicaps of the public
sector compared to powerful private forces are: First, aggregation of political preferences to a clear and
narrowly focused goal is much more complex than maximizing wealth of an individual or the value of
the ﬁrm. Second, policy is organized regionally in states while powerful private agents operate glob-
ally. Regaining the primacy of policy in the regulation of ﬁnancial markets requires thus two things: a
clearly focused goal and global political leadership. Such global leadership does not require a global
government or global coordination on all possible things but the agreement of a few big players to take
action on the one goal. This is not unthinkable to happen. The opinion that something is wrong with
the ﬁnancial system is widely spread among people and in the business world so that a clear goal to
bring it in order by a well-targeted global action has a big potential of broad support.
The action proposed in this paper is regulation which eliminates the creation of risk, in particular sys-
temic risk, by careless ﬁnancial innovation. A minimal requirement is to separate investment banking
from ordinary banking and that states and public funds withdraw from the further. A more credible
and sustainable policy would be - in analogy to other industries, to admit only ﬁnancial products to
the market which have passed the following test: the issuer can show why the product closes a missing
market and how it effects the general or macroeconomic equilibrium (including production and dis-
tribution). Alternatively, a cap or a progessive tax on the rate of return could be used to ban ﬁnancial
innovations which seek for high returns at the cost of the stability and efﬁciency of the system. It may
be argued that such a test would heavily bound the innovation dynamic in the ﬁnancial industry. But
such argument just proves that the regulation is well targeted and exactly fulﬁlls the purpose to elimi-
nate ﬁnancial instruments which potentially destabilize the system.
Let me close with a remark on ideology or - to use another Rothschild-phrase - on the problem of "re-
liance on one eye only and blindness on all other eyes (of which there should be many)".21 Disorder
and appropriate regulation of the ﬁnancial industry are not matters of quarrels about who is the good
guy and who is the bad one, or about who is more (im)perfect, the private sector or the public sector.
Ideological battles on ﬁrst principles are counterproductive here. Nobody is perfect and, if a system is
out of order, bad guys in the public sector as well as in the private sector will exploit it. Appropriate
regulation to bring things in order is therefore the common concern of ordinary people and responsible
leaders in politics as well as in business and banking.
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